group - Noble gases and their compounds
The term noble gases comes from the fact that, to paraphrase the attitude of the nobility, avoid these gases react with the elements common. The noble gases were also called inert gases, but the term was not accurate, because some of them have been shown to take part in chemical reactions. The noble gases do not react with the regular items, do not match, or rather, Silver Haze, but not evenly, like when you put the oil in the water, if known, while stirring vigorously for minutes and minutes you can not mix it evenly. A mixture of noble gases is a chemical compound that contains elements in Group 18 of the periodic table. The hydrates are formed by compressing the noble gases in water. The heavier atoms form more easily its derivatives, Xe 6H2O hydrate is more stable. The clathrates
are composed of noble gases which are trapped in the cavities of the crystals of some organic substances and not. To make sure that you create the atom and the host must be large enough to be fixed in the cavities of the crystals.
The clathrates are used to separate helium and neon from argon, krypton and xenon. Compounds that contain unstable nuclides of noble gases keep their properties clear of decay: the clathrate of 85Kr, for example, emits beta particles, while the clathrate emits gamma rays of 133Xe.
particles beta: The beta radiation is a form of ionizing radiation emitted by certain radioactive nuclei such as cobalt-60;
gamma rays: a form of electromagnetic radiation produced by radioactivity or other nuclear or subatomic processes . Gamma rays are more penetrating than either alpha or beta radiation, but are less ionizing
Thursday, May 14, 2009
Monday, May 11, 2009
How To Build A Big Green Egg Table
The political philosophy of Karl Popper 2
The critique of Comte and John Stuart Mill
of Renzo Grassano
trend is not a law - says Popper.
"A proposition affirming the existence of a trend is existential, not universal."
As already demonstrated, "a universal law, not state the existence of something ... but asserts the impossibility of something ..."
The logic of this distinction has important consequences decisive.
According to Popper, in fact, we found estimates of social value on scientific laws, but not about trends.
"The distinction famous since the time of Comte and Mill between laws of coexistence, which would match the static and the laws of succession corresponding to the dynamics, it can - we agree - be interpreted in a a reasonable manner, that is, it may be a distinction between laws in the wording of which is the time participant (for example laws that speak of speed), and laws that have no reference to the concept of time. But it is precisely what they had in mind Comte and his followers. Saying the laws of succession, Comte thought to the laws that determine the inheritance of a dynamic series of phenomena, the order in which we observe them. Now it is important to realize that the laws "dynamics" of succession, such as Comte thought, absolutely no ... [...] What is the closest to them, and who probably thought, are recurring phenomena, like the seasons, phases of the moon, eclipses or maybe the oscillations of the pendulum. But these intervals, which in physics could be described as dynamic (albeit stationary), would, in the sense of the committee set term, "static" rather than "dynamic" in any case could hardly be described as "laws" (as they depend on special conditions prevailing in the solar system ...) I will call "quasi-law of succession." '(1)
the Austrian philosopher says: "... yes we can assume that any sequence of real phenomena proceeds according to the laws of nature, but it is important that we realize that no sequence of, say, three or four related phenomena proceeds according to one randomly law of nature. When the wind shakes a tree and drop to the ground Newton's apple, no one denies that these events may be described in terms of causal laws. But there is one law, like gravity, or a single well-defined group of laws that can describe the actual sequence of events as a succession of causally related events: in addition to gravity, we should consider the laws that explain the pressure wind, shots of the branch, the tension in the stem of the apple, the apple products in bruises from the collision, the subsequent chemical processes, etc.. The idea that any specific series or sequence of events (apart from the movements of the pendulum, or the solar system, or similar examples,) may be described or explained by a single law, or a group of well-defined laws, is simply wrong. There are no laws of succession, nor laws of evolution.
Yet according to the concept of Comte and Mill, their laws of succession would lead to a series of historical events in the order in which they were actually presented, we can infer from the way in which Mill speaks of a method that "is groped to find out, through the study and analysis of the general facts of history ... the law of progress which the legislation once it was, should ... give us the ability to predict future events, at the same so that, in algebra, after only a few terms of an infinite series, we can see the principle of regularity of their formation, and predict the rest of the series up to any number of terms. This method to maintain a critical attitude, but his critics (see the principle in paragraph 28) widely acknowledges the possibility of finding laws of succession similar to those of mathematical series, although expressing doubt that "the order of succession ... that history shows us "not so" strict standard "to be compared with a mathematical series." (1)
Once recognized, however, in Comte and Mill some merit in the field of epistemology, particularly the critical to 'essentialism (2), Popper believed to give a close almost final lesson, explaining that the method is fundamental.
When you collect data (evidence, facts, set of facts in this case, historical events, ed) to some conclusions about their meaning, not just start with the observations, as some scholars. "... is necessary for the emergence of an interest with respect to our data of a certain story: first of all, it always presents the problem . The problem in turn can be suggested by practical needs, or scientific or pre-scientific belief that for whatever reason seem to need revision. "(1)
In a long and rigorous examination of Mill's thought about the explanation , understanding causal explanation, Popper received a first conclusion: in his thoughts, and to Mill "there is not much difference with regard to the reduction of laws to other more general laws, ie the causal explanation of regularities ".
But Mill is on a "use is not clear" because the term . It is used both to denote the universal laws, is to highlight unusual events.
This creates confusion and leads Mill to a blunder: to ignore, namely, that the persistence of trends is closely related to the initial conditions that have made the same trend. "Mill and his fellow historians have not noticed the trend of the dependence initial conditions. Ensure laws as if they were absolute laws. The confusion between laws and trends that are causes they believe in unconditional trends (and general), or shall we say, trends in absolute, for example, in a general historical trend towards progress - "a trend toward a better state and happier ...
[...] Here, we can say, the central mistake of historicism. His "law of development" turn out to be absolute trends, trends such as laws, which do not depend on initial conditions, and that irresistibly draws us into a certain direction in the future. "(1) Continuing
, Popper devotes ample space to compare between the methods of physical sciences and social scientists, ending up talking about his own conception of epistemology. In particular, stresses the importance of experimental trials. But there is one important step that deserves mention because it highlights the stringency used in the logical reconstruction of the birth of a theory: "Import ... realize that in science we must always deal with explanations, predictions, experiments, and that the method we use to test the hypothesis is the principal part [...] invariable: the hypothesis under consideration - for example a universal law - together with some purpose other propositions are accepted without discussion - for example the initial conditions - we infer prognosis. This prognosis then compare, whenever possible, with the result of other experimental observations. If the prognosis and the observations agree, the hypothesis is considered validated, though not confirmed at all, if they are clearly divided, the hypothesis is considered disproved, and his false evidence.
According to this analysis there is not much difference between the explanation, prediction and experimentation. This is not a difference of logical structure, but in emphasis, it depends on what we consider problematic. If we consider the prognosis is not problematic, and instead issues the initial conditions or some of the universal laws (or both) from which we can deduce a date "prognosis" and we say that this is an explanation (And then the prognosis becomes explicandum). If we consider non-issues laws and initial conditions and we serve only to deduce the prognosis in order to obtain new knowledge, we say that it is a prediction . (This is the case in which we apply our scientific results.) And if we consider a problem of the premises, that is, or a universal law or an initial condition, and whether the prognosis can be determined by experience, then we say that he subjected the premise problematic experimental evidence . '(1)
And here we are at the heart of Popper's conception, much like what we saw in the files on von Hajek . After stating that the
as was found theory is a fact of nature completely private (mah?), Popper says that it is rather important question, "How did you feel your theory?". It 's the only question that matters from a scientific perspective. (More mah?)
He explains: "Now, I am convinced that this applies not only to the natural sciences but also social ones. And in the social sciences is even more evident than in the natural we can not see and observe the objects before our thinking to them. In fact, most of the objects of social science, if not all, are abstract, they are theoretical constructions. (For some it will seem strange, but even "war" or "army" are abstract concepts. Dead men, men in uniform, etc.. - That is what is real.)
These objects, these theoretical constructions that we use to interpret our experiences, resulting from the construction of certain models (especially institutions), to explain certain experiences - a theoretical method well known in the natural sciences (in which we construct models of atoms, molecules, solids, liquids, etc..), and which is also part of the method of explanation by way of reducing or deduction of hypotheses. It 's true that very often we do not realize that we are working theories, and that we delude ourselves that our theoretical models are "things", but this is a very common kind of error. This explains the use of models, and at the same time destroys the thesis of essentialism methodology. He explains, because the model is abstract or theoretical, and we believe we can easily see it in the middle of the turn of events observable or behind them, as a kind of permanent or range of essences. It destroys them because the task is to build a social theory and sociological analysis of our models carefully in descriptive terms nominalist, ie in terms of individuals, their attitudes, their hopes, their relationships, etc.. - The assumption that we can call "methodological individualism. (We've seen in von Hajek, ed) '(1)
Not surprisingly, Popper cites von Hajek paragraphs rather than taking long to arrive, however, to affirm unity of method between the natural sciences and social sciences, while acknowledging some differences.
In the next chapter we shall see these aspects of Popper's theory as to the method.
notes:
(1) Karl Raimund Popper - The Poverty of Historicism - Feltrinelli 1975
(2) essentialism is derived from Aristotle's doctrine was the approach each and every problem that exists with the question "What is it? ", provoking a response of the descriptive claim to arrive at a definition expressing the essence of something. For example, for Aristotle, man is two-footed animal, rational, political (in the sense of friendly and cooperative, but also of slavery ... ahem) Popper claims to be "nominal," that is fierce opponent of essentialism. For a nominalist phenomena can only describe, but you can not tell what it is, for example, a man, or what the "light". Nominalism is in fact a consequence of the birth of modern science, from Galileo and Newton.
The critique of Comte and John Stuart Mill
of Renzo Grassano
trend is not a law - says Popper.
"A proposition affirming the existence of a trend is existential, not universal."
As already demonstrated, "a universal law, not state the existence of something ... but asserts the impossibility of something ..."
The logic of this distinction has important consequences decisive.
According to Popper, in fact, we found estimates of social value on scientific laws, but not about trends.
"The distinction famous since the time of Comte and Mill between laws of coexistence, which would match the static and the laws of succession corresponding to the dynamics, it can - we agree - be interpreted in a a reasonable manner, that is, it may be a distinction between laws in the wording of which is the time participant (for example laws that speak of speed), and laws that have no reference to the concept of time. But it is precisely what they had in mind Comte and his followers. Saying the laws of succession, Comte thought to the laws that determine the inheritance of a dynamic series of phenomena, the order in which we observe them. Now it is important to realize that the laws "dynamics" of succession, such as Comte thought, absolutely no ... [...] What is the closest to them, and who probably thought, are recurring phenomena, like the seasons, phases of the moon, eclipses or maybe the oscillations of the pendulum. But these intervals, which in physics could be described as dynamic (albeit stationary), would, in the sense of the committee set term, "static" rather than "dynamic" in any case could hardly be described as "laws" (as they depend on special conditions prevailing in the solar system ...) I will call "quasi-law of succession." '(1)
the Austrian philosopher says: "... yes we can assume that any sequence of real phenomena proceeds according to the laws of nature, but it is important that we realize that no sequence of, say, three or four related phenomena proceeds according to one randomly law of nature. When the wind shakes a tree and drop to the ground Newton's apple, no one denies that these events may be described in terms of causal laws. But there is one law, like gravity, or a single well-defined group of laws that can describe the actual sequence of events as a succession of causally related events: in addition to gravity, we should consider the laws that explain the pressure wind, shots of the branch, the tension in the stem of the apple, the apple products in bruises from the collision, the subsequent chemical processes, etc.. The idea that any specific series or sequence of events (apart from the movements of the pendulum, or the solar system, or similar examples,) may be described or explained by a single law, or a group of well-defined laws, is simply wrong. There are no laws of succession, nor laws of evolution.
Yet according to the concept of Comte and Mill, their laws of succession would lead to a series of historical events in the order in which they were actually presented, we can infer from the way in which Mill speaks of a method that "is groped to find out, through the study and analysis of the general facts of history ... the law of progress which the legislation once it was, should ... give us the ability to predict future events, at the same so that, in algebra, after only a few terms of an infinite series, we can see the principle of regularity of their formation, and predict the rest of the series up to any number of terms. This method to maintain a critical attitude, but his critics (see the principle in paragraph 28) widely acknowledges the possibility of finding laws of succession similar to those of mathematical series, although expressing doubt that "the order of succession ... that history shows us "not so" strict standard "to be compared with a mathematical series." (1)
Once recognized, however, in Comte and Mill some merit in the field of epistemology, particularly the critical to 'essentialism (2), Popper believed to give a close almost final lesson, explaining that the method is fundamental.
When you collect data (evidence, facts, set of facts in this case, historical events, ed) to some conclusions about their meaning, not just start with the observations, as some scholars. "... is necessary for the emergence of an interest with respect to our data of a certain story: first of all, it always presents the problem . The problem in turn can be suggested by practical needs, or scientific or pre-scientific belief that for whatever reason seem to need revision. "(1)
In a long and rigorous examination of Mill's thought about the explanation , understanding causal explanation, Popper received a first conclusion: in his thoughts, and to Mill "there is not much difference with regard to the reduction of laws to other more general laws, ie the causal explanation of regularities ".
But Mill is on a "use is not clear" because the term . It is used both to denote the universal laws, is to highlight unusual events.
This creates confusion and leads Mill to a blunder: to ignore, namely, that the persistence of trends is closely related to the initial conditions that have made the same trend. "Mill and his fellow historians have not noticed the trend of the dependence initial conditions. Ensure laws as if they were absolute laws. The confusion between laws and trends that are causes they believe in unconditional trends (and general), or shall we say, trends in absolute, for example, in a general historical trend towards progress - "a trend toward a better state and happier ...
[...] Here, we can say, the central mistake of historicism. His "law of development" turn out to be absolute trends, trends such as laws, which do not depend on initial conditions, and that irresistibly draws us into a certain direction in the future. "(1) Continuing
, Popper devotes ample space to compare between the methods of physical sciences and social scientists, ending up talking about his own conception of epistemology. In particular, stresses the importance of experimental trials. But there is one important step that deserves mention because it highlights the stringency used in the logical reconstruction of the birth of a theory: "Import ... realize that in science we must always deal with explanations, predictions, experiments, and that the method we use to test the hypothesis is the principal part [...] invariable: the hypothesis under consideration - for example a universal law - together with some purpose other propositions are accepted without discussion - for example the initial conditions - we infer prognosis. This prognosis then compare, whenever possible, with the result of other experimental observations. If the prognosis and the observations agree, the hypothesis is considered validated, though not confirmed at all, if they are clearly divided, the hypothesis is considered disproved, and his false evidence.
According to this analysis there is not much difference between the explanation, prediction and experimentation. This is not a difference of logical structure, but in emphasis, it depends on what we consider problematic. If we consider the prognosis is not problematic, and instead issues the initial conditions or some of the universal laws (or both) from which we can deduce a date "prognosis" and we say that this is an explanation (And then the prognosis becomes explicandum). If we consider non-issues laws and initial conditions and we serve only to deduce the prognosis in order to obtain new knowledge, we say that it is a prediction . (This is the case in which we apply our scientific results.) And if we consider a problem of the premises, that is, or a universal law or an initial condition, and whether the prognosis can be determined by experience, then we say that he subjected the premise problematic experimental evidence . '(1)
And here we are at the heart of Popper's conception, much like what we saw in the files on von Hajek . After stating that the
as was found theory is a fact of nature completely private (mah?), Popper says that it is rather important question, "How did you feel your theory?". It 's the only question that matters from a scientific perspective. (More mah?)
He explains: "Now, I am convinced that this applies not only to the natural sciences but also social ones. And in the social sciences is even more evident than in the natural we can not see and observe the objects before our thinking to them. In fact, most of the objects of social science, if not all, are abstract, they are theoretical constructions. (For some it will seem strange, but even "war" or "army" are abstract concepts. Dead men, men in uniform, etc.. - That is what is real.)
These objects, these theoretical constructions that we use to interpret our experiences, resulting from the construction of certain models (especially institutions), to explain certain experiences - a theoretical method well known in the natural sciences (in which we construct models of atoms, molecules, solids, liquids, etc..), and which is also part of the method of explanation by way of reducing or deduction of hypotheses. It 's true that very often we do not realize that we are working theories, and that we delude ourselves that our theoretical models are "things", but this is a very common kind of error. This explains the use of models, and at the same time destroys the thesis of essentialism methodology. He explains, because the model is abstract or theoretical, and we believe we can easily see it in the middle of the turn of events observable or behind them, as a kind of permanent or range of essences. It destroys them because the task is to build a social theory and sociological analysis of our models carefully in descriptive terms nominalist, ie in terms of individuals, their attitudes, their hopes, their relationships, etc.. - The assumption that we can call "methodological individualism. (We've seen in von Hajek, ed) '(1)
Not surprisingly, Popper cites von Hajek paragraphs rather than taking long to arrive, however, to affirm unity of method between the natural sciences and social sciences, while acknowledging some differences.
In the next chapter we shall see these aspects of Popper's theory as to the method.
notes:
(1) Karl Raimund Popper - The Poverty of Historicism - Feltrinelli 1975
(2) essentialism is derived from Aristotle's doctrine was the approach each and every problem that exists with the question "What is it? ", provoking a response of the descriptive claim to arrive at a definition expressing the essence of something. For example, for Aristotle, man is two-footed animal, rational, political (in the sense of friendly and cooperative, but also of slavery ... ahem) Popper claims to be "nominal," that is fierce opponent of essentialism. For a nominalist phenomena can only describe, but you can not tell what it is, for example, a man, or what the "light". Nominalism is in fact a consequence of the birth of modern science, from Galileo and Newton.
Tuesday, April 14, 2009
How Doyo Draw A Joker Logo
The political philosophy of Karl Popper
The Open Society and its Enemies
by Renzo Grassano
The Open Society and its Enemies was published in 1945. The writing matured during the long period of exile of Popper in New Zealand and it is certainly his "masterpiece of political philosophy.
The roots of totalitarianism are detected again in historicism, especially the Hegelian, but rooted in the dawn of philosophy, authors such as Hesiod, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle himself, blamed for essentialism. The major targets are still controversial Nazism and Communism, the theories of race and the thought of Marx.
The most obvious manifestation of totalitarianism and closed societies, tribal and collectivist-style, dominated by taboos, where the lives of individuals is regulated by strict rules imposed by the authorities. "A closed society looks like a sheep or a tribe that is semi-organic unit whose members are bound together by ties." Instead, the open society is one in which men are free to take the helm of their lives, free to express a critical attitude, free to base their decisions on the authority of one's intelligence.
The distinction between closed societies and open society was borrowed from the French philosopher Henri Bergson, who, however, had used it in a different pattern of thinking.
The question on everyone's mind was always "who should govern?" This demand has resulted in sterile defined answers, like, the best, the philosophers, an enlightened ruler, the people, the superior race. It is also false because it presupposes an answer good and honest leaders. Popper to be rid of this question, surpassing it with another: "How can we organize political institutions in order to prevent the bad and incompetent rulers do too much damage?"
serves institutional control of governments. Only for implementing solve the paradox of democracy is the paradox of a people that chooses the tyranny, as happened in Germany with the advent of Hitler.
Popper drew a line between totalitarianism and freedom that is expressed in a clear distinction between dictatorship and democracy.
writes: "1. Democracy can not be fully characterized only as a majority government, although the imposition of a general election is of utmost importance. In fact, a majority can rule in a tyrannical (the majority of those who have less than 6 feet tall may decide that those who have more than six feet tall to pay all taxes). In a democracy the powers of the governors should be limited and the criterion of democracy is this: the rulers in a democracy - that the government - can be dismissed without bloodshed. So if the men in power do not safeguard those institutions which provide the minority the opportunity to work for peaceful change, their government is a tyranny.
2. We must distinguish between only two forms of government, that is what has institutions of this kind and all others that is between democracy and tyranny.
3. A democratic constitution has consistently ruled out only one type of change that threaten its democratic character.
4. In a democracy, the full protection of minorities should not extend to those who violate the law, and especially to those who incite others to violent overthrow of democracy.
5. A policy aims at the introduction of institutions aimed For the protection of democracy must always operate under the assumption that there may be anti-democratic tendencies latent between Governments and between the rulers.
6. If democracy is destroyed, all rights will be destroyed, even if they maintained some economic advantages enjoyed by the government, they would only on the basis of resignation.
7. Democracy offers a valuable battlefield for any reasonable reform because it allows the implementation of reforms without violence. But if prevention of democracy does not become the paramount concern in any particular battle being conducted on this battlefield, the latent anti-democratic tendencies that are always present (and which appeal to those suffering under the effects of stressful society ...) can lead to the collapse of democracy. If the understanding of these principles is not yet sufficiently developed, we must promote it. The opposite policy can be fatal, it can result in loss of the most important battle, which is the battle for democracy itself. "
In other words, it is clear that in an open society institutions can not allow bullies and the powerful to enslave the meek: and this is a limit to freedom, which can not be unlimited. But there is a limit to tolerance, if we extend it to the intolerant, if we are not willing to protect a company tolerant against the onslaught of the intolerant, "then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them." But this is not always valid, and these words are used more as a guideline in the crucial moments of a possible attack on democracy. In fact, says Popper, the suppression is less than wise decisions. "But we should proclaim the right to remove intolerant, if necessary by force, if it, denouncing all argument" resort to the use of fists and guns. "
between democratic procedures and the methodological rules of science , according to Popper, should take place a kind of analogy based on a clear congruence of situations: both in the activity in political science that we find ways to solve problems. And even in politics takes imagination, creativity, new approaches are needed to forge, that is to be subjected to close monitoring. Even in politics, as we have seen the question of controllability is crucial. And even in political dogmatism and the one who is deluded to have a definite truth, and do not realize that new facts, new discoveries, the emergence of new cases can deny it.
In The Open Society and its Enemies have a further attack on historicism that this time it is stated, also bravely (since orgine Popper was Jewish and was in exile for persecuted by the Nazis), anti-theological theory of chosen people. He openly criticizes the idea that God chooses a people to implement his designs. It 'obvious that this criticism also extends to those who replace or qualocos'altro nature, to God
The reasons of historicism must therefore look prophetic antiquity, the same philosophy, in which men like Hesiod and Heraclitus forced the hand of history by interpreting it in a dogmatic and definitive. After defining Hesiod the poet of the decadence of humanity Heraclitus and the theory of the immutable law of change , Popper railed against Plato, which is the opposite of Heraclitus, that is the theoretical thinking that "change is bad and stasis is divine." According to Popper, Plato was a reactionary put out against the news of the Athenian democracy, essentially hostile to those positions on the Democratic heirs of Pericles.
Aristotle also not spared: The prosecution is to methodological essentialism, which is a way of thinking that has seriously compromised the science and philosophy for centuries. The task of science is in fact nobody available to the application what is the matter? decrivere but the behavior of the phenomena: "Thus the scientific conception of the definition" a young puppy is a dog "would be that it is an answer to the question "what we call a young dog?" rather than the question "what is a puppy?" In essence, says Popper, science does not seek an explanation last and then it is not essential.
In contrast, in the social sciences remains an old-fashioned essentialism, and Marxism is its most important example.
Before coming to Marx, Popper plays a ruthless critique of Hegel, the father of modern historicism and totalitarianism.
illiberal aspects of Hegel are the Platonic cult status, the tribal and collectivist mentality, and the refusal of an ethical principle above the state and the resolution of moral in politics and the concept that the only possible criterion of action against the state is the world-historical achievement of its policies. Finally, the theory that the state could only exist by the war, with the aggravating circumstance of the thesis of a nation elected to serve from time to time by driving. Finally, the great man theory of personality and world-historical. All this, according to Popper, was inherited and developed by the Nazis.
Moreover, Hegel was intellectually and morally dishonest, "Hegel produced the most miraculous things. Logic high, it was child's play for his highly effective methods dialectical pull rabbits from hats purely physical metaphysical. "
Compared to Marx, it should be noted a position of greater respect, because we should not forget that Popper was initially attracted by socialist ideas.
But even with Marx's criticism is fierce. The attack on the communication takes place in the first instance as a process of epistemological. "I think that is absolutely correct to say that Marxism is basically a method. But it is wrong to believe that, as a method, should be sheltered from any attack. The truth is, quite simply, that any person wishing to judge Marxism should prove it and quote it as a method, that is, measure it on the basis of methodological criteria. Must ask whether it is in fact a method fruitful or sterile, that is, if he is or is not able to facilitate the task of science. "
Popper considers proper, valid and fair to consider even fundamental economic conditions for an assessment of historical processes. But, according to him, Marx took too seriously the fundamental term . E 'essentialism, and as such, is not better than everyone else. The conception of the state of Marx, for example, is essentialist, that responds to the classic question: what 'status'? And if the answer is classic: the organizational form of the domination of bourgeois class society, serious consequences arise from this attitude as the devaluation of the policy to the benefit of the economy and also the contempt for democracy formal.
Popper believes, essentially, in the light of what has been gaining in social development, political power is independent economically, and may also affect in some way. The devaluation of the political, in Marxism, led to dogmatic conceptions that have impeded the reform.
In sharp contrast to the thought of his friend FA von Hajek, Popper was in fact a staunch advocate of the role of the state and political economy, in some respects close to the moderate left. In fact Popper
political power has a duty to control the economic power: "This means a huge expansion of the scope of political activities. We can ask what we want to achieve and how we can achieve it. We can, for example, implement a rational political program for the protection of the economically weak. We can make laws to limit exploitation. We can limit the working day, but we can do even more. By law, we can ensure that workers (or better yet, all citizens) against disability, unemployment, old age. In this way we can make it impossible for certain forms of exploitation such as those based on weak economic position of a worker who has to accept anything not to die of hunger ... [...]
Political power and its control is everything. Economic power must not be allowed to dominate political power, if necessary, it must be fought by political power and brought back under its control. "
positions are shared by a left less tainted by ideological bias. The problem is that Italy's political thought has struggled Popper, I'm not saying to impose itself, but simply to present itself given the current hegemony of the Marxist historical-cultural life.
Personally I agree, even if you do not feel especially well suited to the current situation of our country that needs a deal between the producers able to purify politics and curb the power of big business, less state and more market, reforms that do not destroy the state but to the benefit of trouble as the Federal Senate.
In the next chapter we will see the development of Popper's critique of Marx.
The Open Society and its Enemies
by Renzo Grassano
The Open Society and its Enemies was published in 1945. The writing matured during the long period of exile of Popper in New Zealand and it is certainly his "masterpiece of political philosophy.
The roots of totalitarianism are detected again in historicism, especially the Hegelian, but rooted in the dawn of philosophy, authors such as Hesiod, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle himself, blamed for essentialism. The major targets are still controversial Nazism and Communism, the theories of race and the thought of Marx.
The most obvious manifestation of totalitarianism and closed societies, tribal and collectivist-style, dominated by taboos, where the lives of individuals is regulated by strict rules imposed by the authorities. "A closed society looks like a sheep or a tribe that is semi-organic unit whose members are bound together by ties." Instead, the open society is one in which men are free to take the helm of their lives, free to express a critical attitude, free to base their decisions on the authority of one's intelligence.
The distinction between closed societies and open society was borrowed from the French philosopher Henri Bergson, who, however, had used it in a different pattern of thinking.
The question on everyone's mind was always "who should govern?" This demand has resulted in sterile defined answers, like, the best, the philosophers, an enlightened ruler, the people, the superior race. It is also false because it presupposes an answer good and honest leaders. Popper to be rid of this question, surpassing it with another: "How can we organize political institutions in order to prevent the bad and incompetent rulers do too much damage?"
serves institutional control of governments. Only for implementing solve the paradox of democracy is the paradox of a people that chooses the tyranny, as happened in Germany with the advent of Hitler.
Popper drew a line between totalitarianism and freedom that is expressed in a clear distinction between dictatorship and democracy.
writes: "1. Democracy can not be fully characterized only as a majority government, although the imposition of a general election is of utmost importance. In fact, a majority can rule in a tyrannical (the majority of those who have less than 6 feet tall may decide that those who have more than six feet tall to pay all taxes). In a democracy the powers of the governors should be limited and the criterion of democracy is this: the rulers in a democracy - that the government - can be dismissed without bloodshed. So if the men in power do not safeguard those institutions which provide the minority the opportunity to work for peaceful change, their government is a tyranny.
2. We must distinguish between only two forms of government, that is what has institutions of this kind and all others that is between democracy and tyranny.
3. A democratic constitution has consistently ruled out only one type of change that threaten its democratic character.
4. In a democracy, the full protection of minorities should not extend to those who violate the law, and especially to those who incite others to violent overthrow of democracy.
5. A policy aims at the introduction of institutions aimed For the protection of democracy must always operate under the assumption that there may be anti-democratic tendencies latent between Governments and between the rulers.
6. If democracy is destroyed, all rights will be destroyed, even if they maintained some economic advantages enjoyed by the government, they would only on the basis of resignation.
7. Democracy offers a valuable battlefield for any reasonable reform because it allows the implementation of reforms without violence. But if prevention of democracy does not become the paramount concern in any particular battle being conducted on this battlefield, the latent anti-democratic tendencies that are always present (and which appeal to those suffering under the effects of stressful society ...) can lead to the collapse of democracy. If the understanding of these principles is not yet sufficiently developed, we must promote it. The opposite policy can be fatal, it can result in loss of the most important battle, which is the battle for democracy itself. "
In other words, it is clear that in an open society institutions can not allow bullies and the powerful to enslave the meek: and this is a limit to freedom, which can not be unlimited. But there is a limit to tolerance, if we extend it to the intolerant, if we are not willing to protect a company tolerant against the onslaught of the intolerant, "then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them." But this is not always valid, and these words are used more as a guideline in the crucial moments of a possible attack on democracy. In fact, says Popper, the suppression is less than wise decisions. "But we should proclaim the right to remove intolerant, if necessary by force, if it, denouncing all argument" resort to the use of fists and guns. "
between democratic procedures and the methodological rules of science , according to Popper, should take place a kind of analogy based on a clear congruence of situations: both in the activity in political science that we find ways to solve problems. And even in politics takes imagination, creativity, new approaches are needed to forge, that is to be subjected to close monitoring. Even in politics, as we have seen the question of controllability is crucial. And even in political dogmatism and the one who is deluded to have a definite truth, and do not realize that new facts, new discoveries, the emergence of new cases can deny it.
In The Open Society and its Enemies have a further attack on historicism that this time it is stated, also bravely (since orgine Popper was Jewish and was in exile for persecuted by the Nazis), anti-theological theory of chosen people. He openly criticizes the idea that God chooses a people to implement his designs. It 'obvious that this criticism also extends to those who replace or qualocos'altro nature, to God
The reasons of historicism must therefore look prophetic antiquity, the same philosophy, in which men like Hesiod and Heraclitus forced the hand of history by interpreting it in a dogmatic and definitive. After defining Hesiod the poet of the decadence of humanity Heraclitus and the theory of the immutable law of change , Popper railed against Plato, which is the opposite of Heraclitus, that is the theoretical thinking that "change is bad and stasis is divine." According to Popper, Plato was a reactionary put out against the news of the Athenian democracy, essentially hostile to those positions on the Democratic heirs of Pericles.
Aristotle also not spared: The prosecution is to methodological essentialism, which is a way of thinking that has seriously compromised the science and philosophy for centuries. The task of science is in fact nobody available to the application what is the matter? decrivere but the behavior of the phenomena: "Thus the scientific conception of the definition" a young puppy is a dog "would be that it is an answer to the question "what we call a young dog?" rather than the question "what is a puppy?" In essence, says Popper, science does not seek an explanation last and then it is not essential.
In contrast, in the social sciences remains an old-fashioned essentialism, and Marxism is its most important example.
Before coming to Marx, Popper plays a ruthless critique of Hegel, the father of modern historicism and totalitarianism.
illiberal aspects of Hegel are the Platonic cult status, the tribal and collectivist mentality, and the refusal of an ethical principle above the state and the resolution of moral in politics and the concept that the only possible criterion of action against the state is the world-historical achievement of its policies. Finally, the theory that the state could only exist by the war, with the aggravating circumstance of the thesis of a nation elected to serve from time to time by driving. Finally, the great man theory of personality and world-historical. All this, according to Popper, was inherited and developed by the Nazis.
Moreover, Hegel was intellectually and morally dishonest, "Hegel produced the most miraculous things. Logic high, it was child's play for his highly effective methods dialectical pull rabbits from hats purely physical metaphysical. "
Compared to Marx, it should be noted a position of greater respect, because we should not forget that Popper was initially attracted by socialist ideas.
But even with Marx's criticism is fierce. The attack on the communication takes place in the first instance as a process of epistemological. "I think that is absolutely correct to say that Marxism is basically a method. But it is wrong to believe that, as a method, should be sheltered from any attack. The truth is, quite simply, that any person wishing to judge Marxism should prove it and quote it as a method, that is, measure it on the basis of methodological criteria. Must ask whether it is in fact a method fruitful or sterile, that is, if he is or is not able to facilitate the task of science. "
Popper considers proper, valid and fair to consider even fundamental economic conditions for an assessment of historical processes. But, according to him, Marx took too seriously the fundamental term . E 'essentialism, and as such, is not better than everyone else. The conception of the state of Marx, for example, is essentialist, that responds to the classic question: what 'status'? And if the answer is classic: the organizational form of the domination of bourgeois class society, serious consequences arise from this attitude as the devaluation of the policy to the benefit of the economy and also the contempt for democracy formal.
Popper believes, essentially, in the light of what has been gaining in social development, political power is independent economically, and may also affect in some way. The devaluation of the political, in Marxism, led to dogmatic conceptions that have impeded the reform.
In sharp contrast to the thought of his friend FA von Hajek, Popper was in fact a staunch advocate of the role of the state and political economy, in some respects close to the moderate left. In fact Popper
political power has a duty to control the economic power: "This means a huge expansion of the scope of political activities. We can ask what we want to achieve and how we can achieve it. We can, for example, implement a rational political program for the protection of the economically weak. We can make laws to limit exploitation. We can limit the working day, but we can do even more. By law, we can ensure that workers (or better yet, all citizens) against disability, unemployment, old age. In this way we can make it impossible for certain forms of exploitation such as those based on weak economic position of a worker who has to accept anything not to die of hunger ... [...]
Political power and its control is everything. Economic power must not be allowed to dominate political power, if necessary, it must be fought by political power and brought back under its control. "
positions are shared by a left less tainted by ideological bias. The problem is that Italy's political thought has struggled Popper, I'm not saying to impose itself, but simply to present itself given the current hegemony of the Marxist historical-cultural life.
Personally I agree, even if you do not feel especially well suited to the current situation of our country that needs a deal between the producers able to purify politics and curb the power of big business, less state and more market, reforms that do not destroy the state but to the benefit of trouble as the Federal Senate.
In the next chapter we will see the development of Popper's critique of Marx.
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