The critique of Comte and John Stuart Mill
of Renzo Grassano
trend is not a law - says Popper.
"A proposition affirming the existence of a trend is existential, not universal."
As already demonstrated, "a universal law, not state the existence of something ... but asserts the impossibility of something ..."
The logic of this distinction has important consequences decisive.
According to Popper, in fact, we found estimates of social value on scientific laws, but not about trends.
"The distinction famous since the time of Comte and Mill between laws of coexistence, which would match the static and the laws of succession corresponding to the dynamics, it can - we agree - be interpreted in a a reasonable manner, that is, it may be a distinction between laws in the wording of which is the time participant (for example laws that speak of speed), and laws that have no reference to the concept of time. But it is precisely what they had in mind Comte and his followers. Saying the laws of succession, Comte thought to the laws that determine the inheritance of a dynamic series of phenomena, the order in which we observe them. Now it is important to realize that the laws "dynamics" of succession, such as Comte thought, absolutely no ... [...] What is the closest to them, and who probably thought, are recurring phenomena, like the seasons, phases of the moon, eclipses or maybe the oscillations of the pendulum. But these intervals, which in physics could be described as dynamic (albeit stationary), would, in the sense of the committee set term, "static" rather than "dynamic" in any case could hardly be described as "laws" (as they depend on special conditions prevailing in the solar system ...) I will call "quasi-law of succession." '(1)
the Austrian philosopher says: "... yes we can assume that any sequence of real phenomena proceeds according to the laws of nature, but it is important that we realize that no sequence of, say, three or four related phenomena proceeds according to one randomly law of nature. When the wind shakes a tree and drop to the ground Newton's apple, no one denies that these events may be described in terms of causal laws. But there is one law, like gravity, or a single well-defined group of laws that can describe the actual sequence of events as a succession of causally related events: in addition to gravity, we should consider the laws that explain the pressure wind, shots of the branch, the tension in the stem of the apple, the apple products in bruises from the collision, the subsequent chemical processes, etc.. The idea that any specific series or sequence of events (apart from the movements of the pendulum, or the solar system, or similar examples,) may be described or explained by a single law, or a group of well-defined laws, is simply wrong. There are no laws of succession, nor laws of evolution.
Yet according to the concept of Comte and Mill, their laws of succession would lead to a series of historical events in the order in which they were actually presented, we can infer from the way in which Mill speaks of a method that "is groped to find out, through the study and analysis of the general facts of history ... the law of progress which the legislation once it was, should ... give us the ability to predict future events, at the same so that, in algebra, after only a few terms of an infinite series, we can see the principle of regularity of their formation, and predict the rest of the series up to any number of terms. This method to maintain a critical attitude, but his critics (see the principle in paragraph 28) widely acknowledges the possibility of finding laws of succession similar to those of mathematical series, although expressing doubt that "the order of succession ... that history shows us "not so" strict standard "to be compared with a mathematical series." (1)
Once recognized, however, in Comte and Mill some merit in the field of epistemology, particularly the critical to 'essentialism (2), Popper believed to give a close almost final lesson, explaining that the method is fundamental.
When you collect data (evidence, facts, set of facts in this case, historical events, ed) to some conclusions about their meaning, not just start with the observations, as some scholars. "... is necessary for the emergence of an interest with respect to our data of a certain story: first of all, it always presents the problem . The problem in turn can be suggested by practical needs, or scientific or pre-scientific belief that for whatever reason seem to need revision. "(1)
In a long and rigorous examination of Mill's thought about the explanation , understanding causal explanation, Popper received a first conclusion: in his thoughts, and to Mill "there is not much difference with regard to the reduction of laws to other more general laws, ie the causal explanation of regularities ".
But Mill is on a "use is not clear" because the term . It is used both to denote the universal laws, is to highlight unusual events.
This creates confusion and leads Mill to a blunder: to ignore, namely, that the persistence of trends is closely related to the initial conditions that have made the same trend. "Mill and his fellow historians have not noticed the trend of the dependence initial conditions. Ensure laws as if they were absolute laws. The confusion between laws and trends that are causes they believe in unconditional trends (and general), or shall we say, trends in absolute, for example, in a general historical trend towards progress - "a trend toward a better state and happier ...
[...] Here, we can say, the central mistake of historicism. His "law of development" turn out to be absolute trends, trends such as laws, which do not depend on initial conditions, and that irresistibly draws us into a certain direction in the future. "(1) Continuing
, Popper devotes ample space to compare between the methods of physical sciences and social scientists, ending up talking about his own conception of epistemology. In particular, stresses the importance of experimental trials. But there is one important step that deserves mention because it highlights the stringency used in the logical reconstruction of the birth of a theory: "Import ... realize that in science we must always deal with explanations, predictions, experiments, and that the method we use to test the hypothesis is the principal part [...] invariable: the hypothesis under consideration - for example a universal law - together with some purpose other propositions are accepted without discussion - for example the initial conditions - we infer prognosis. This prognosis then compare, whenever possible, with the result of other experimental observations. If the prognosis and the observations agree, the hypothesis is considered validated, though not confirmed at all, if they are clearly divided, the hypothesis is considered disproved, and his false evidence.
According to this analysis there is not much difference between the explanation, prediction and experimentation. This is not a difference of logical structure, but in emphasis, it depends on what we consider problematic. If we consider the prognosis is not problematic, and instead issues the initial conditions or some of the universal laws (or both) from which we can deduce a date "prognosis" and we say that this is an explanation (And then the prognosis becomes explicandum). If we consider non-issues laws and initial conditions and we serve only to deduce the prognosis in order to obtain new knowledge, we say that it is a prediction . (This is the case in which we apply our scientific results.) And if we consider a problem of the premises, that is, or a universal law or an initial condition, and whether the prognosis can be determined by experience, then we say that he subjected the premise problematic experimental evidence . '(1)
And here we are at the heart of Popper's conception, much like what we saw in the files on von Hajek . After stating that the
as was found theory is a fact of nature completely private (mah?), Popper says that it is rather important question, "How did you feel your theory?". It 's the only question that matters from a scientific perspective. (More mah?)
He explains: "Now, I am convinced that this applies not only to the natural sciences but also social ones. And in the social sciences is even more evident than in the natural we can not see and observe the objects before our thinking to them. In fact, most of the objects of social science, if not all, are abstract, they are theoretical constructions. (For some it will seem strange, but even "war" or "army" are abstract concepts. Dead men, men in uniform, etc.. - That is what is real.)
These objects, these theoretical constructions that we use to interpret our experiences, resulting from the construction of certain models (especially institutions), to explain certain experiences - a theoretical method well known in the natural sciences (in which we construct models of atoms, molecules, solids, liquids, etc..), and which is also part of the method of explanation by way of reducing or deduction of hypotheses. It 's true that very often we do not realize that we are working theories, and that we delude ourselves that our theoretical models are "things", but this is a very common kind of error. This explains the use of models, and at the same time destroys the thesis of essentialism methodology. He explains, because the model is abstract or theoretical, and we believe we can easily see it in the middle of the turn of events observable or behind them, as a kind of permanent or range of essences. It destroys them because the task is to build a social theory and sociological analysis of our models carefully in descriptive terms nominalist, ie in terms of individuals, their attitudes, their hopes, their relationships, etc.. - The assumption that we can call "methodological individualism. (We've seen in von Hajek, ed) '(1)
Not surprisingly, Popper cites von Hajek paragraphs rather than taking long to arrive, however, to affirm unity of method between the natural sciences and social sciences, while acknowledging some differences.
In the next chapter we shall see these aspects of Popper's theory as to the method.
notes:
(1) Karl Raimund Popper - The Poverty of Historicism - Feltrinelli 1975
(2) essentialism is derived from Aristotle's doctrine was the approach each and every problem that exists with the question "What is it? ", provoking a response of the descriptive claim to arrive at a definition expressing the essence of something. For example, for Aristotle, man is two-footed animal, rational, political (in the sense of friendly and cooperative, but also of slavery ... ahem) Popper claims to be "nominal," that is fierce opponent of essentialism. For a nominalist phenomena can only describe, but you can not tell what it is, for example, a man, or what the "light". Nominalism is in fact a consequence of the birth of modern science, from Galileo and Newton.
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